Bangsamoro, Governance, News

The PNP- Board of Inquiry report on the Mamasapano incident

Cbanga360.Net - The Bicol Street Journal

First Published         15 Mar , 2015      3:53 pm. (UTC/GMT -8 HRS)

Page 8

5. In the same meeting where the President instructed Napenas and suspended CPNP Purisima to coordinate with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)”, PDG Purisima threafter said the Napenas; “Ako na ang bahala kay Catapang,.” the PNP Ethical Doctrine Manual cites, Word of Honor – PNP members’ word is their bond. They stand by the commit to it,” the statement of Purisima may be construed as an assurance of providing the coordination instructed by the President.

6. Suspended CPNP Purisima provided inaccurate information to the President about the actual situation on the ground when he send text messages to the President stating that SAF Commandos were pulling out”, and that they were supported by mechanized and artillery support”.


7. Despite his knowledge of the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, Napenas followed the instructions of suspended CPNP Purisima not to inform OIC-PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus. This violated the PNP Chain of Command.

8. Napenas failed to effectively supervise, control and direct personnel, which resulted in heavy casualties of the SAF Commandos, Under the Manual on Fundamental Doctrines, Command Responsibility means that a commander is responsible for effectively supervising, controlling, and directing his personnel. Under the same doctrine, a commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.

9. Napenas followed his Time-on-target (TOT) coordination concept despite the directive of the President to coordinate with the AFP prior to the operation.

10. The TOT coordination concept adopted by the SAF does not conform with the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP.

11. The protocols of the established peace process mechanisms, though the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), were not observed during the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus.

12. The mission planning of Oplan Exodus was defective due to: (1) poor analysis of the area of operation; (2) unrealistic assumptions; (3) poor intelligence estimate; (4) absence of abort criteria; (5) lack of flexibility in its CONOPS; (6) inappropriate application of TOT; ang (7) absence of prior coordination with the AFP and AHJAG.

13. The following factors affected the execution of CONOPS; (1) mismanaged movement plan from staging area to Vehicle-Drop-Off Point (VDOP); (2) failure to occupy the designed way points; (3) ineffective communication system among the operating troops; (4) unfamiliarity with the terrain in the area of operation; (5)non-adherence to operational/tactical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); (6) lack of situational awareness among commanders; and (6) breakdown in the command and control.

Read more, links below



Pages: Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10

First Published         15 Mar , 2015      3:53 pm      (UTC/GMT -8 HRS)       with 1,357 views.


Suggested For You